

POLYBIUS, ROME, AND THE EAST *

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I

Sixteen years ago, in an article entitled 'Polybius and Rome's eastern policy,' F. W. Walbank raised and examined aspects of what seemed to be an absolutely central flaw in the fabric of Polybius' account of Roman expansion in the Greek world.¹ The situation that he saw both then and a decade later in his Sather Lectures on Polybius² may be put briefly, and I hope fairly, as follows. Polybius believed that Rome's eastern expansion came as the conscious execution by Rome of a consciously adopted plan. Such a view, however, is altogether at odds with the interpretation worked out by Maurice Holleaux³ on the basis of Polybius' own narrative (and its survivals in Livy). This state of affairs could come about because of a fundamental contradiction between Polybius' general statements and his own detailed narrative. This contradiction, in fact, manifests itself throughout Polybius' work, particularly in the form of inconsistency between his general statements about Rome's expansion and his detailed analyses of the causes of wars. Walbank confronted Polybius' contradiction squarely and offered an explanation of how Polybius came to be misled in his general view, in the course of which Fortune (τύχη) is cast as seductress, aided by Polybius' hindsight of 168 and after, and by his assumption that it was the normal tendency of imperial states to expand. It was Polybius' view of the purpose of Fortune (and not the detailed evidence) that begot in his mind the purpose of the Romans, and as a result he 'has committed himself to an interpretation of Roman policy which is inconsistent with the detailed narrative which his honesty and sincerity have led him to write.'⁴

What follows here seeks to continue (or to re-open, as the case may be) the discussion that Walbank began, for it seems to me that the contradiction between Polybius and Holleaux is of a quite different order from that suggested and, far more important, that the contradiction or inconsistency between Polybius and himself is not there at all. Put in another way, the aim is to make it clear that the refutation of Polybius' general view about Roman expansion in the East must be (and, therefore, always has been) based upon either more or less than Polybius himself provides. This inquiry is accordingly to be regarded as an attempt to establish Polybius' views on this expansion of Roman power in the East and to show that he was consistent in the way he thought about his subject. To determine whether his general view and the detailed discussions and analyses that give support and expression to it are, in fact, correct must be another and different kind of undertaking. Details, Polybian and otherwise, only touched upon or wholly omitted here will be essential there, but if Polybius is seen to be consistent, the presumption will have to be that he is the best interpreter of his own evidence.

The contradiction between Polybius and Holleaux is the less worrying of the two and may be examined first. The position more easily stated is that of Holleaux, which Walbank has accurately summed up as follows: 'Put briefly, Holleaux's thesis is that down to 200 B.C. the Romans, as a result of long indifference to the Greek world, had no eastern policy; they intervened in Greece in the two Illyrian wars and the first Macedonian war through a succession of accidents, and disengaged themselves on each occasion as quickly as possible.'⁵ This is rounded out a few pages later: 'The sequence of events recorded in Polybius and the Polybian parts of Livy confirms Holleaux's thesis that the Romans left Greece after Phoenice without any intention of returning and that the Second Macedonian

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University of Toronto, and Lucy Grieve and Philip Kay, of Wadham College, Oxford. To all these at once my thanks and my apologies for having left it less good than their help might have made it.

¹ *JRS* 53 (1963), 1-13.

² F. W. Walbank, *Polybius* (1973), esp. ch. 6; see also ch. 1 of *Polybe (Entretiens Hardt xx)* (1974).

³ Primarily in *Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques au III^e siècle avant J.-C.* (1921).

⁴ *op. cit.* (n. 1), 11.

⁵ *ibid.* 1.

War represents a remarkable volte-face in their eastern policy.⁶ Holleaux's interpretation of the outbreak of the second Macedonian war,⁷ though adjusted from time to time, has enjoyed a notable success. While its validity will not be directly at issue here, it will nevertheless become imperative to ask whether it (in any of its forms) can really be said to be based upon Polybius (see below, section III).

At this point, however, one must look more closely at the view of Polybius that is here at issue and to which Holleaux's thesis is (at least in part) opposed. Considered first will be the question as to when the Romans came to conceive of their universal aim (ἡ τῶν ὄλων ἐπιβολή), and then (in section II) the content of this notion will be defined.

Two passages of Polybius are primarily involved here, 1. 3. 6 and 3. 2. 6.⁸ In the first of them the universal aim is introduced :

For having defeated the Carthaginians in the aforementioned war (i.e., the Hannibalic war) and believing that they had accomplished the greatest and most important step towards their universal aim (πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὄλων ἐπιβολήν), thus and then for the first time were the Romans emboldened to reach out their hands for the rest and to cross with forces into Greece and the regions of Asia.

It reappears, in a somewhat varied form, in Polybius' announcement of his intent to provide a special account of the Roman constitution (3. 2. 6) :

Halting the narrative at this point (viz., at the end of Book 5) we shall draw up our account of the Roman constitution, as a direct sequel to which we shall point out that the singular nature of the constitution contributed very greatly not only to their reacquisition of mastery (δυναστεία) over the Italians and Sicilians, and to their attainment of rule (ἀρχή) over the Spaniards and Gauls, but also, finally, to their forming the conception of their universal aim when they defeated the Carthaginians in the war (ἀλλὰ τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρατήσαντας τῷ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίων ἔννοιαν σχεῖν τῆς τῶν ὄλων ἐπιβολῆς).

These two statements may seem at first sight to be at odds with one another, the second suggesting that the Romans came to conceive of their universal aim only after their victory in the second Punic war, the first that they viewed this victory as a step towards the accomplishment of this aim. This could be seen as an inconsistency, but it is by no means necessary to see it as such. When taken together, the two passages conspire to say that at the time of the victory over Carthage the Romans realized that they had accomplished what was in fact the greatest and most important step in the direction of world rule, that the decision to reach for the whole arose both with and out of the victory over Carthage. The Romans chose to proceed along the road, as it were, when they realized they were already a fair way towards its end. This may seem odd, but it is not inconsistent. And it certainly is the way Polybius thought, for it corresponds exactly to his expressed views about three earlier stages in the expansion of Rome's power, all of which indicate that, for Polybius, it was success, or one signal success in particular, that helped to stimulate the Romans to broaden their aims. At 1. 20. 1-3, it is with the success at Agrigentum that the Romans decide to go for the whole of Sicily.⁹ At 2. 31. 8, the same thing happens with regard to Gaul in 225/4—even the wording is very close to 1. 20. 1-3. Similar again, with an earlier point of reference, is 1. 6. 6: 'When they had already defeated the Gauls of Italy in many battles, then for the first time they set out after the rest of Italy.' This leads directly back to 1. 3. 6: 'Then for the first time they were emboldened to reach out their hands for the rest.' But in 1. 3. 6 there is an additional element: the universal aim (ἡ τῶν ὄλων ἐπιβολή). Roman expansion has been going on before; it is only at this point, after so much had already been won, that Polybius believed the project of establishing universal rule was

⁶ *ibid.* 5.

⁷ *Rome, la Grèce*, chs. 7 and 8. See also his chapters in *CAH VIII* (for the original of which: ch. 14 of *Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques V* (1957)).

⁸ In *JRS* (53) 1963, 6 Walbank argued that Pol. 1. 63. 9 indicated that the project was conceived in 241, but this position was abandoned (rightly) in *Polybius* (161 and n. 38) under the influence of K.-E.

Petzold, *Studien zur Methode des Polybios und zu ihrer historischen Auswertung* (1969), 175 and n. 4. On the interpretation of Pol. 9. 10, see below, p. 3.

⁹ cf. 2. 20. 10: the first Punic war as a struggle ὑπὲρ τῆς Σικελιωτῶν ἀρχῆς. Such it became, according to Polybius, only with the Roman success at Agrigentum.

conceived. In 1. 6. 6 it was 'the rest of Italy'. In 1. 3. 6 it is simply 'the rest', but the process of expanding aims is essentially the same.

On the basis of certain passages in Books 1, 9, and 15 it has been argued that Polybius believed Rome's universal aim to predate the victory over Carthage in the second Punic war. At issue are 1. 3. 7, 9. 10. 11, 15. 9. 5 (cf. 9. 2), and 15. 10. 2.¹⁰ None of these passages seems to me to support such a contention. The context of 9. 10. 11 is the earliest, and it should be dealt with first. In a narrative section now lost Polybius described how the Romans, after the successful completion of the siege of Syracuse in 211, removed to Rome quantities of statues and other works of art. He then sets about discussing whether such behaviour is right or not, beneficial or otherwise (cf. 9. 10. 3). After distinguishing between this sort of booty and the more ordinary gold and silver, he goes on (9. 10. 11):

Perhaps it makes some sense for (the victors) to collect the gold and silver for themselves, for it is not possible to contend for general control (ἀντιποιήσασθαι τῶν καθόλου πραγμάτων) except by bringing weakness upon others and garnering the corresponding power for oneself.

But that which goes beyond this (paintings and the like), he says, were better left behind. The point here is a straightforward one. Throughout this section Polybius is speaking generally. This generality is of two kinds. At one level it applies to anyone seeking mastery (13: οὐ μὴν ἄλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τῶν μεταλαμβανόντων αἰεὶ τὰς δυναστείας). At another it applies to the Romans, but not only to their actions at Syracuse (note esp. 3: πλείων γε μὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ δεόντως σφίσι πεπράχθαι μηδ' ἄκμην νῦν πράττεσθαι τοῦτο τοῦργον). The time at issue is thus from Syracuse to the present.¹¹ That the Romans were dealing directly in τὰ καθόλου πράγματα for most of this period is true, but it is not to be inferred that Polybius saw them doing so at the beginning of it.¹²

At 1. 3. 7 Polybius describes Rome and Carthage (at the time of the second Punic war) as the states disputing for universal rule (ἢ τῶν ὄλων ἀρχή). Taken by itself this could mean that both sides entered and fought the war with universal rule as their aim. That it does not carry this implication is clear in general from Polybius' discussion of the outbreak of that war (where desire for universal rule is never mentioned) and in particular from the amplification of this statement found at 15. 9. 5, a passage indicating that 1. 3. 7 is not a statement about the aims and intentions of the belligerents at all:

For the victors in the battle were going to be masters not only of Libya and Europe, but of all the parts of the world now known.

This is a statement of fact and no more: world rule was going to accrue to the victor in the battle (Polybius reminds us that this is indeed what happened); world rule was effectively the prize at stake.

15. 10. 2 does go somewhat beyond this, but the significance of the extension is other than it has been thought to be:

He bade them . . . to keep it before their eyes that by overcoming their enemies they would not only be securely masters of affairs in Libya, but they would also gain for themselves and their fatherland the undisputed leadership and sovereignty over the rest of the world.

Two points about this passage must be recognised immediately. First, it is the first time that world rule appears as a Roman aim in an historical context (cf. above on 9. 10. 11); this is moments before the battle of Zama. Second, this aim is not presented as a disembodied view ascribed to Rome, or Romans, in general; the statement is given as Scipio's and as his alone. From this one cannot but infer that, according to Polybius, the notion of world rule

¹⁰ See *JRS* (53) 1963, 6, 9, and Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* II (1967) ad Pol. 9. 10. 11.

¹¹ The reference is, *int. al.*, to 167 and the removal of treasures after the victory over Perseus: see Walbank, *Commentary*, ad 9. 10. 3.

¹² It may be noted that a different sort of problem

does reside here. Along with Polybius' reference to the Roman decision to remove the statues etc. (9. 10. 2) and Livy's account of what Marcellus brought back (26. 21. 7 f.), there is the latter's report that a quaestor had been sent to take charge of *pecunia regia* (25. 31. 8); but in 210 there is no money in the treasury at Rome (Livy 26. 35. 2).

was in Scipio's mind at the time of the battle of Zama: he realized what Polybius had already said was in fact at stake. 1. 3. 6 and 3. 2. 6 show, as argued above, that only with the victory over Carthage did the aim become a general one, did ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολή emerge. As far as one can tell from what is left of Polybius' text, he believed the idea of universal rule appeared first in the mind of Scipio just prior to the battle that sealed the defeat of Carthage;¹³ then, once the victory had been achieved and its importance and implications recognized, the aim of world rule was conceived in the minds of the victors: ἔννοιαν σχεῖν τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολῆς (3. 2. 6). Following upon the conception of this project the Romans began to carry it out (that is to say the rest of it), 'to reach out their hands for the rest and to cross with forces into Greece and the regions of Asia' (1. 3. 6).

Indeed, it may be as well to remark that, on any interpretation of the genesis of their aim, it is only after the victory over Carthage that the Romans put it into operation in Greece and the East: τότε πρῶτον in 1. 3. 6 is decisive. This means that, according to Polybius, the first Roman venture in the East that manifests the universal aim is the second Macedonian war. This war he evidently saw as consciously undertaken by Romans consciously aiming at world control. In this he is at odds with Holleaux and indeed with all the most influential treatments of the second Macedonian war since Holleaux. The disagreement is fundamental, but it must be emphasized that the contradiction between Polybius and Holleaux referred to earlier reduces to this disagreement and to this disagreement alone. Some consideration of the years leading up to the second Macedonian war will be necessary (section III, below), but for the moment attention must be turned to the content of Rome's universal aim.

II

A good deal has been said above about what Polybius calls ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολή. At the same time the notion has, as will not have escaped notice, been left rather vague: 'universal aim' or 'quest for world, or universal, dominion' are expressions that tell us too little (or, perhaps, too much). One must be more precise about this notion, for there can be no possibility of understanding Polybius' view of Rome's eastern expansion without first knowing just what it was he believed the Romans both sought and achieved. It seems to me that this question of the content of Rome's universal aim can be answered quite specifically, and it is particularly important to do this, as Polybius' general view has been taken to connote 'aggressive Roman imperialism'¹⁴ and to be such as to suggest that the Romans in Polybius should be found actually beginning wars.

The definition of Rome's aim according to Polybius may best proceed in steps. We have seen that ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολή was introduced by Polybius in 1. 3. 6. Later in the same chapter we are told that what the Romans sought and obtained was ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχή καὶ δυναστεία—universal rule and dominion, and from this it follows that with the inception of their universal aim the Romans began consciously to seek universal rule. What, then, does 'universal rule' mean for Polybius' Romans? It refers, simply, to that situation in which everybody was subject to the Romans; Polybius' aim was to show 'by what management of individual affairs the Romans rendered the entire inhabited world subject to themselves' (πῶς ἕκαστα χειρίσαντες Ῥωμαῖοι πᾶσαν ἐποίησαντο τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπήκοον αὐτοῖς: 3. 3. 9). 'Subject to' has a variety of meanings, but there is only one that can apply here, as is clear from the next chapter of Book 3 (3. 4. 2-3):

The fifty-three-year period came to an end with these events (i.e., in 168/7), and the increase and extension of the Romans' dominion was completed. It seemed, moreover, to be universally agreed as a matter of strict necessity that what remained was to hearken to the Romans and to obey their orders (Ῥωμαίων ἀκούειν καὶ τούτοις πειθαρχεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν παραγγελλομένων).

On the one side there are orders and on the other obedience. Rome's possession of ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχή καὶ δυναστεία means that everyone must in practice obey Roman orders, and

¹³ It is perhaps not without significance that Scipio has appeared in this connexion: cf. Pol. 21. 4. 5 (quoted below, p. 12).

¹⁴ Walbank, op. cit. (n. 1), 8.

ἡ τῶν ὄλων ἐπιβολή accordingly refers to Rome's intention to bring this state of affairs about. As long as obedience was not universal the process went on; with the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy in 168/7 there ceased to be any serious question.

As has already been seen, the first manifestation of Rome's universal aim came in connexion with the second Macedonian war. With the content of that aim now determined, it should be possible to see exactly what this means. In the spring of 200 B.C. a Roman embassy in Athens met Philip's commander Nicanor and bade him report to the king (16. 27. 2-3):

... that the Romans call upon the king to make war against none of the Greeks, and to answer for the wrongs done to Attalus before a fair tribunal; and that it would be possible for him to live at peace with the Romans if he did these things, but if he did not wish to obey (πειθεσθαι), they said, the opposite would ensue.

Later that year a slightly different set of 'requests' was conveyed to Philip himself at Abydos, but the basic message was the same: 'that he could have peace if he acted thus, but if he did not wish to obey (πειθορχεῖν), a war against the Romans would be ready to hand' (16. 34. 4). There can be no thought here of Rome seeking amends in connexion with a more or less specific situation, as happens in Polybius' account of the first Illyrian war. Explicitly at issue is the general question of obedience to Roman orders,¹⁵ and this is the first time in Polybius that this has been the case. And such is exactly what should have been expected, for this is the first occasion on which Rome's universal aim has been involved.

From this point on the orders/obedience (or failure to obey) syndrome¹⁶ permeates Rome's dealings with the Hellenistic world, and Polybius' history of the years after 200 B.C. is in a real sense an account of the responses of various kings and other people to Roman orders. There will be occasion below to notice some instances of this syndrome, but it may be worthwhile here to look briefly at these and to note some others as well, if only to make it quite clear that this is the essential element in Rome's eastern 'expansion' and that in this regard Rome treated everybody the same way.

After Philip, the Romans went on to deal with Antiochus, and their approach to him in 196 was quite the same as to Philip in 200. Roman ambassadors ordered (δικακελεύομενοι) him to stay clear of certain Greek cities, and to withdraw from others that he was holding (18. 47. 1), and they forbade him to cross into Europe (προηγόρευον μὴ διαβαίνειν: 18. 47. 2). The same attitude is evinced later at Lysimacheia (18. 50. 5: ἡξίου . . . διεμαρτύρητο; 50. 7: παρήναι), and whenever there are negotiations once the war has started (cf. 21. 14. 4, 14. 9, 15. 13, etc.). As a sidelight, one may recall here the statement mentioned earlier (21. 4. 5; above, n. 13) to the effect that Scipio knew that the aim was not really to subdue the Aetolians but to defeat Antiochus and thereby gain power over Asia (κρατῆσαι τῆς Ἀσίας). What is involved in κρατῆσαι is expressed in terms of orders and obedience in 36. 9. 6:

¹⁵ It is the presence here of this element of obedience that distinguishes the present case from the otherwise not wholly dissimilar one (an 'ally' was involved) of Rome's dealings with and ultimatum to Carthage just before the second Punic war (compare, with Pol. 16. 27 and 34, particularly 3. 15, esp. § 5, and 3. 20. 6-8).

¹⁶ The expressions involved are varied, especially in the matter of orders and ordering. The words used most frequently in contexts involving Rome's eastern dealings are as follows: (1) ἐπιτάττω (with ἐπιταττόμενος, ἐπίταγμα, ἐπιταγή): cf. 18. 9. 5, 38. 2; 20. 10. 16; 21. 4. 14, 5. 3, 6. 1, 14. 9, 15. 13, 24. 13; 22. 11. 3, 14. 1; 24. 11. 7, 13. 2, 13. 3; 29. 27. 13; 30. 23. 3; 31. 1. 10; 32. 2. 7; 33. 9. 3. (2) παραγγελλόμενος, παραγγελέναι: cf. 21. 33. 3; 24. 9. 1, 9. 10, 12. 4, 13. 6; 28. 13. 4; 32. 13. 8; 36. 4. 7, 5. 4, 5. 6, 6. 3, 6. 6, 9. 6. (3) προστάττω (and προσταττόμενος, πρόσταγμα, προσταχθέν: cf. 20. 10. 14; 21. 15. 13; 22. 1. 5, 15. 3; 23. 2. 6; 24. 11. 4; 27. 8. 3; 29. 27. 9; 30. 31. 8; 33. 12. 4; 36. 5. 5, 9. 8. (4) παρακαλέω (and παρακαλούμενος): cf. 16. 27. 2, 34. 3; 18. 9. 2, 9. 7, 37. 4; 20. 10. 6;

22. 4. 12, 10. 3; 24. 8. 3, 11. 6, 15. 1; 29. 27. 6, 27. 9. (5) κελεύω (and κελεύόμενος): cf. 18. 1. 3; 22. 4. 9; 23. 5. 17; 24. 13. 4, 15. 9; 36. 6. 5. These all seem to be quite interchangeable (see esp. 24. 8-13 and 36. 4-6), and all are at sometime or another obeyed (along with, on occasion, γραφόμενα (cf. 24. 8. 4, 8. 6), λεγόμενα (cf. 22. 4. 10) and ἀποκρίσεις (cf. 30. 23. 2)). The chief expressions for obeying are πειθορχεῖν and, less frequently, πειθεσθαι: cf. 16. 27. 3, 34. 3; 18. 9. 2; 22. 4. 10, 8. 4, 8. 6, 9. 1, 9. 9, 9. 14, 12. 14; 29. 27. 3; 30. 13. 9, 23. 2, 30. 3, 31. 8; 32. 13. 8; 36. 5. 6, 9. 6, 9. 7, 11. 3; also, on occasion, ὑπακούω, συνυπακούω (cf. 24. 9. 9, 11. 7, 12. 4). The verbs are mostly followed by one of the aforementioned nouns. Not infrequently, obedience is signalled simply by some form of ποιεῖν τὸ παραγγελλόμενος (cf. 18. 9. 7, 37. 4; 22. 4. 12; 24. 13. 6; 36. 6. 6, 9. 6), τὸ παρακαλούμενος (cf. 22. 4. 12; 29. 27. 6), or τὸ προσταχθέν (cf. 23. 2. 6, etc.). These lists, while not complete, will at least give a fair indication of the frequency with which these notions occur in Polybius' account of Rome's relations with the Hellenistic world from 200 B.C. onwards.

Previously they (the Romans) made war against everyone to the point where they gained power (κρατήσαι) and their opponents conceded that they must obey them and do what they were told (πειθεσθαι σφισι και ποιειν το παραγγελόμενον).

In the years immediately following the war against Antiochus, a number of people had to deal with Roman instructions as to what they should do and how behave. Directly affected were the Boeotians (22. 4) and the Achaeans (24. 8–13 passim; cf. 22. 3. 3 and esp. 23. 17. 4), and on one occasion the Romans wrote to the Achaeans and Aetolians, commanding (κελεύοντες) them to see to the restoration of a certain Boeotian exile (22. 4. 9). But the most striking case of the 180's is that of the unfortunate Philip V of Macedon. Various Roman orders to him are referred to at 22. 1. 3 and 14. 1, 23. 2. 6 and 8. 2 (and cf. 22. 6. 5 for the invitation of accusations against him, that lead to orders, and 13. 2 for the effect of the orders on the size of his realm). The Roman resolve is made clear when Philip is told (23. 3. 3) that the Senate will no longer be able to bear or endure being disobeyed (παρακουμένη) on these matters. In view of this sort of treatment it should come as no surprise that Philip decided to prepare for war against Rome, and it is worth noting that the issue of Roman orders was still a live one for Perseus in 171: he hoped then to render the Romans more cautious about issuing harsh and unjust commands to the Macedonians (27. 8. 3).

It will be seen below (p. 14) how the Romans wanted to compel the Illyrians to obey their requests (πειθεσθαι τοις υπ' αυτων παραγγελουμένοις: Pol. 32. 13. 8): this came about because of the Senate's annoyance at the disobedience (ἀπειθεια) and awkwardness of the Dalmatians (32. 13. 4). Earlier, Eumenes had run foul of Rome because of his failure to obey (πειθαρχειν) the decrees of the Senate (30. 30. 3),¹⁷ and later it is Prusias' disobedience (ἀπειθεια) that gets him into trouble (33. 12. 8).

Such examples could be multiplied (as a glance at the passages cited in n. 16 indicates), but it should by now be clear that what the Romans sought, on Polybius' account, was to be obeyed by everyone with whom they dealt, and that they were prepared to threaten and even to go to war to ensure this obedience.

III

That Holleaux and Polybius are at odds would not be problematical were it not for the fact that Holleaux is believed to have built his interpretation firmly upon the basis of 'the sequence of events recorded in Polybius and the Polybian parts of Livy' (cf. above, pp. 1–2). If this were indeed the case, we should be confronted with the situation envisaged above: Polybius' general view refuted on the basis of his own detailed narrative. But here a basic question must be asked: can it be said that Holleaux's view of the outbreak of the second Macedonian war is based solely or primarily upon Polybius and the Polybian parts of Livy, that Polybius and the Polybian parts of Livy confirm Holleaux's thesis (and not, therefore, Polybius' own)? The answer is no. Of Polybius' account of the years at issue (205–200) there survives very little indeed, either directly or in Livy's narrative, and what does remain of what is or may be Polybian became evidence for Holleaux only after certain adjustments. It is, in a sense, not the Polybian evidence as it stands that produced Holleaux's view, but Holleaux's view that dictated what is to be considered the Polybian evidence. This emerges most clearly if one looks closely at the cases of the Peace of Phoenice and the Aetolian appeal, both of which are central elements in Holleaux's reconstruction of the years from the Peace of Phoenice in 205 to the outbreak of war in 200.

His treatment of the Peace of Phoenice (*Rome, la Grèce*, esp. 276–80) is necessarily based upon Livy 29. 12, which his references in this context designate as 'Liv.(P.)'. In an earlier discussion, this same chapter of Livy was reckoned to be basically Polybian but to have been retouched by Livy on the basis of an annalistic tradition (258, n. 4). At issue there was the clause giving the *adscripti* to the treaty (Livy 29. 12. 14; see in general *Rome, la*

¹⁷ On Rome and Eumenes, see the letter of Attalus II to the priest Attis of about 156 B.C., C. B. Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (1934), no. 61. It shows a very acute (and Polybian: see also

23. 17. 4) appreciation of Roman 'foreign policy' in general and of Rome's attitude towards Eumenes II in particular.

Grèce, 258–71; cf. 54 n. 1, 56 n. 2), which Holleaux reckoned to be vitiated by the introduction of annalistic inventions. On this he may or may not have been right. What matters more is the point of method that arises: if the chapter is admitted to be part Polybian and part annalistic, how is one to decide which parts are which, when the corresponding narrative of Polybius is irretrievably lost? This question poses itself acutely in relation to 29. 12. 16, where Livy records the ratification of the treaty at Rome and the reason behind the ratification: ‘iusseruntque omnes tribus, quia verso in Africam bello omnibus aliis in praesentia levare bellis volebant’. (‘And all the tribes ordered it, because, with the war transferred to Africa, they wished to be relieved of all other wars for the moment.’) The treaty was of course ratified at Rome, but the notion that the Romans reckoned the settlement with Philip a temporary one from the start does not square with Holleaux’s thesis (see esp. *Rome*, 284–9). As a result of this (and for no other reason that I can see) 29. 12. 16, when it is evidence for the vote on the treaty, is cited as ‘Livy (P.)’ (*Rome*, 280, n. 2); but when the reason for the peace is at issue (i.e., ‘quia . . . volebant’), the ascription is to annalists (284, n. 1). The aim in this is simply to brand the offending *quia*-clause as unreliable, which is surely not a sound way of proceeding. The ascription of this clause to Roman annalists is, moreover, at least a little curious. Their aim (insofar as they can be said to have had a single aim) was to show that the war that broke out in 200 was prompted and justified by injuries done by Philip to Roman allies.¹⁸ To emphasize, as is done in 29. 12. 16, that the Peace of Phoenice was regarded at Rome as a temporizing postponement of hostilities against Philip, does not tend at all in the same direction. Most important, the statement in question cannot be said to conflict with anything that can with good reason be attributed to Polybius; if anything, the opposite seems more likely to be true.¹⁹

A part, then, of Livy 29. 12. 16 was rejected by Holleaux because it stood at odds with his view of Roman conduct in the years between the wars. This view, in turn, rests heavily upon his treatment of the Aetolian appeal (*Rome*, 293–7). According to Holleaux, Polybius related that in 202, probably but not certainly after the battle of Zama, the Aetolians appealed to Rome for help against Philip but were rudely rebuffed; this rebuff is taken as an indication that the Romans had at the time no intention at all of renewing their involvement in Greece.²⁰ The Roman rejection does a kind of double duty for Holleaux. (1) It shows (according to him) the Romans undesirous of involvement in Greece; (2) this in turn is taken to mean that it cannot have come when Appian (*Mac.* 4. 2) has it, in 201 after the Rhodian embassy: at this point (on Holleaux’s thesis) the Romans began again to think seriously about the East. One cannot but detect an element of circularity here. The implication of the Roman rejection comes first (no interest in the East); then the incident is moved back to a time when it can carry this implication (202); then the implication is taken as informative about the Romans in 202. This is not acceptable. There is only one date for the Aetolian appeal that has any authority at all, and that is Appian’s: latish in 201, after the Rhodian embassy. There is nothing in this section of Appian to suggest that the appeal does not belong where he puts it. The only reason for moving it is that it will not bear a certain interpretation unless it is put somewhere else: ‘Si les Aitoliens étaient venus à Rome à l’époque indiquée (i.e., Appian’s date), le Sénat les auraient reçus à bras ouverts’ (*Rome*,

¹⁸ See esp. the reason stated in the Roman war proposal: ‘ob iniurias armae illata sociis populi Romani’; cf. also the complaints against Philip lodged at Rome by the ‘legati sociarum urbium ex Graecia’ (in 203/2: Livy 30. 26. 2; cf. 30. 42. 8–10). The same notion seems to be present in 31. 1. 9, where the Romans are ‘infensos Philippo . . . ob infidam adversus Aetolos aliosque regionis eiusdem socios pacem’, but this section is most curious both for the mention of the Aetolians in this way, as well as for the statements in 1. 8 about the chronology and cause of the previous war with Philip which do not agree at all with Livy’s account in the previous decade. On 31. 1 see J. Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy, Books 31–33* (1973), 52–5. Briscoe does not explain how Livy in 31. 1 came to connect the beginning of the war with the Aetolians, but it may be recalled that in a speech in Polybius the ἀρχὴ τοῦ πολέμου is associated

with the treaty between Rome and the Aetolians (11. 5. 9); also that the Roman ambassador in Livy 31. 31. 18 (most likely a Polybian section) says to the Aetolians ‘nos pro vobis bellum suscepimus adversus Philippum’ (cf. 31. 29. 5 and Briscoe, *Commentary*, ad locc.).

¹⁹ Particularly worth noting is Polybius’ statement that the second war against Philip took its ἀφορμὰι from the war against Hannibal (3. 32. 7). One might also compare Appian, *Mac.* 3. 2.

²⁰ The Aetolian appeal is referred to in what there is no reason to believe is not a Polybian section of Livy (31. 29. 4); for a select bibliography on it see Briscoe, *Commentary*, ad loc. Briscoe himself leaves the appeal in 201 (before the Rhodian and Pergamene embassies) but holds basically to Holleaux’s interpretation of the Roman rejection.

293, n. 1; cf. 295). If, however, one approaches the evidence as it is without preconceptions, the following situation is encountered: late in 201 (when a renewal of hostilities with Philip was on any view very much in prospect, if not indeed being prepared for), the Senate rejected, emphatically and rudely, an appeal from the Aetolians to renew their alliance and to help them against Philip. This poses a question, but it is a question that must be answered instead of evaded: why would the Romans have done this at such a time, especially as they later went on to obtain the alliance of the same Aetolians in the fight against Philip?

First of all, it is to be noted that when the Romans *do* speak of alliance to the Aetolians, they make it very clear that the Aetolians are lucky to have the chance to join them: their choice lies between winning with Rome and perishing with Philip (Livy 31. 31. 20). This looks like an ultimatum; it is at least clear who is to be master here. Secondly, it must be emphasized that it is not until this time, spring 199, that the Romans approached the Aetolians on the subject of alliance. The Roman embassy that visited the Aetolians in spring 200 (Pol. 16. 27. 4) paid identical visits to the Epirots, to Amynder in Athamania, and to the Achaeans (*ibid.*) and informed all alike of Rome's intention to defend the Greeks against Philip's aggressions. Here the Aetolians are pointedly treated as just one among Philip's friends and allies in Greece.²¹ Alliances were not sought on this occasion, and the Roman approach to the Aetolians, when it was made, was not, as has been seen, a friendly one. Evidently, then, the Romans were doing their very best to show themselves not very fond of their erstwhile allies. Nor are the reasons for this behaviour hard to discern. Most important and most simply, the Romans were clearly anxious to appear as the friends of the Greeks in this war against Philip, and there should be no need to labour the point that their previous association with the Aetolians had gained them nothing but the distrust and hatred of a good many Greeks. More specifically, this hatred had led to dire predictions of a particular tenor: that the Romans, when quit of the Hannibalic War, would return to Greece in full force on the pretext of aiding the Aetolians and that Philip's allies, which is to say most of the Greeks, would then suffer even more.²² In the second war with Philip the Romans wanted Greek allies (followers?); there were no ready ones in Greece itself save the Aetolians, but to start with these meant forgoing virtually all others and indeed pushing the rest into Philip's camp. Roman recognition of loudly-voiced Greek feeling led directly to the reassuring visits to Philip's allies in the spring of 200 and in particular to Rome's treatment of the Aetolians—from the rejected appeal in 201, through the implicit statement that the Aetolians were Philip's allies and not Rome's in 200, to the arrogant invitation to the Aetolians to seek renewal of their alliance with Rome in the spring of 199. In all of this the Romans are consistent, even calculating, and it is an element of this consistency that the rejection of the Aetolian appeal must be seen as stemming from the decision to renew the war with Philip.

Consistent also is the foregoing account with the evidence we have and particularly with all indications that can be accounted Polybian. At all events, it should be clear at least that Holleaux's account of Rome and Greece in the years immediately preceding the second Macedonian war cannot be said to be based upon, or to be confirmed by, Polybius.

Holleaux's view, then, remains at odds with that of Polybius, but this opposition is no longer problematical, for it is certainly not the case that Holleaux is to be preferred as being closer to the Polybian facts. There is rather every reason to think, as should not be surprising, that Polybius was the better master of his own evidence. Holleaux was justifiably sceptical of the views of many of his predecessors and contemporaries, but so concerned was he to demolish 'the extravagant theories, once fashionable, of Roman interventions in Eastern politics and Roman treaties of "friendship" or "alliance" with Greek monarchs and republics'²³ that (it may be suggested) he reacted too strongly, and in the process the baby (in this case Polybius) went out with the bath water.

²¹ And not, it seems, without reason: cf. Dio 17, Fr. 57. 59 (on 206): (ὁ Φιλίππος) τοὺς δὲ Αἰτωλοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς συμμαχίας τῆς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ρ[...]. τινὶ ἀποσπᾶσας φίλους ἐποιήσατο; and Livy 31. 28. 6 (spring 199): 'ad Aetolos mittit (Philippus) legatos, ne gens inquieta adventu Romanorum fidem mutaret'.

²² For anti-Roman sentiment during the first Macedonian war, see Pol. 9. 37-39; 10. 25; 11. 4-6; for the prediction, 11. 6. 2-3.

²³ E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (1958), 44.

IV

There remains the other difficulty alluded to at the outset of section 1, involving the matter of direct inconsistency between Polybius' general view and his own detailed narrative. To return to Walbank's formulation of the problem: on the one hand there is Rome's universal aim; on the other, 'when he is analysing the *detailed* causes of the wars in which the Romans were involved, he makes it clear that the Second Punic War was the responsibility of the Carthaginians and the Third Macedonian War that of Philip.'²⁴ (The outbreak of the second Punic war predates, to be sure, the inception of the universal aim, but the problem here is not with this kind of detail.) On this view Polybius is alleged to maintain both that Rome was aiming at universal rule and that her antagonists were the ones responsible for the wars that led to their conquest by Rome. This does perhaps sound odd, but—again the basic question—is it true? With the first part of the allegation there can be no quarrel, but can it be said that Polybius does thus assign responsibility for the various wars? The answer must, I think, be that he does not deal in terms of responsibility at all, or at least not in any direct way. He did not, in other words, spend his time treating of *Kriegsschuldfragen*. This emerges from the kind of system of causal explanation that he worked with, on which we have his own clear statement at 3. 6. 7:

ἐγὼ δὲ παντὸς ἀρχῆς μὲν εἶναι φημι τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις τῶν ἤδη κεκριμένων, αἰτίας δὲ τὰς προκαθηγουμένας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων· λέγω δ' ἐπινοίας καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα συλλογισμοὺς καὶ δι' ὧν ἐπὶ τὸ κρίναι τι καὶ προθέσθαι παραγιγόμεθα.

I maintain that the beginnings (ἀρχαί) of anything are the first attempts and actions of those who have already taken decisions, but that the reasons (αἰτίαι) are what lead up to the decisions and judgments; I refer here to ideas and states of mind and reckonings about these and the things through which we come to take decisions and form projects.

This takes as its starting point the beginning (ἀρχή), which in a war is the first overt act of hostility by one of the belligerents. It requires, therefore, that the causes, rather the reasons (αἰτίαι), be sought on that side: what needs explaining on this kind of analysis is why, for example, the Carthaginians and Perseus opened hostilities. About Polybius' formulation two things need to be noted at the start. First, nothing is said about responsibility. Second, what matters are the αἰτίαι; for Polybius they provide the ultimate answer as to why something happened. From this it must follow that if we are to question Polybius about responsibility at all, we shall have to seek the answers in his accounts of αἰτίαι.

At this point it will be useful to examine the case of the second Punic war. Besides being one of the chief instances referred to by Walbank, it provides a complete discussion of ἀρχή versus αἰτίαι (the only one that survives intact) and is therefore likely to offer a good indication of how Polybius' system works in practice, both in general and on the question as to how one should go about inferring responsibility from a Polybian causal explanation.

The ἀρχή of the second Punic war lies with Carthage, and the αἰτίαι are first, the wrath of Hamilcar Barca, second and greatest the Roman seizure of Sardinia, and third the euphoria produced in the Carthaginians by their successes in Spain.²⁵ (First, second and third, it should be noted here, serve to indicate chronological order.²⁶) If one is to inquire as to responsibility, the answer must be found in this statement of αἰτίαι. The most important of them is the second, the *μεγίστη* αἰτία, the Roman seizure of Sardinia in 238 B.C.²⁷ This apparently had the most to do with the start of the war, and this in turn must lead ineluctably to the conclusion that, on Polybius' account, the Romans were most responsible for the war. One can afford here to be even more positive, for on this one occasion Polybius does address himself to the question of responsibility (prompted to do so

²⁴ *op. cit.* (n. 1), 11. The same view is expressed by A. Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom* (1975), 28.

²⁵ *Pol.* 3. 9. 6–10. 6.

²⁶ This follows from the fact that the numbering reflects chronological order both here and in the Alexander example in 3. 6. 10–11; this seems to me to have been missed by Walbank, *Polybius*, 158.

²⁷ Bearing this in mind, I cannot agree with the assertion of Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom*, 28: 'Even the arbitrary occupation of Sardinia by the Romans, though freely admitted to be unjust (3. 28. 2), is not directly connected with the origins of the second Punic war'.

by the legalizing discussions going on around him during his stay in Rome : see 3. 29. 1). In 3. 30. 3-4 we have the following :

Therefore, if one posits the destruction of Saguntum as the reason (αἰτία) for the war, it must be granted that the Carthaginians began the war unjustly, both in view of the treaty of Lutatius, according to which the allies of each were to have security from attack by the other, and also in view of the agreement with Hasdrubal, according to which the Carthaginians were not to cross the Ebro river for purpose of war. But if (one posits as the reason for the war) the seizure of Sardinia and the accompanying money, it must certainly be agreed that the Carthaginians fought the Hannibalic war with good reason: for, after yielding to circumstances, they defended themselves when they could against those who harmed them.

Saguntum or Sardinia? By chapter 30 of Book 3 we know exactly where Polybius stood on that question (see esp. 3. 6. 2-3). And from this we can see that, for Polybius, responsibility was a matter that went well beyond the question of who made the first move. At all points, then, one must ask not only who started it, but also—and this especially—what made them decide to do it.

This means, however, that in order to begin asking Polybius about responsibility, one must have to hand his full discussion of the αἰτία of whatever war is at issue. And this immediately poses a problem in dealing with the wars most relevant to this paper, namely those fought in the East between 200 and 167, the period of the accomplishment of Rome's universal aim. These are the second and third Macedonian wars and the war against Antiochus, and for none of them do we have complete Polybius' treatment of ἀρχή and αἰτία. Yet there are some indications along the way, and these must be examined to see whether or not they point in the same direction as what has just been observed about his discussion of the outbreak of the second Punic war. The order will be chronological. First Philip, then Antiochus, and then Perseus.

Each of these three cases has something odd about it, but to my mind the oddest is the case of the second Macedonian war. Not only is there no surviving discussion of its ἀρχή and αἰτία, but there is nothing that can count as a fragment of that discussion or even as an announcement by Polybius that there was going to be such a discussion. Some have apparently seen such an announcement in 3. 3. 2, at least to judge from their translations. The passage reads as follows :

ἐξηγησάμενοι δὲ τὰς Ἀττάλου καὶ Ῥοδίων ναυμαχίας πρὸς Φίλιππον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν Ῥωμαίων καὶ Φιλίππου πόλεμον, ὡς ἐπράχθη καὶ διὰ τίνων καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἔσχευ . . .

It is, of course, the διὰ τίνων that has caused trouble here, at least to some English translators. Paton in the Loeb gives 'the war between the Romans and Philip, its course, *its reason*, and its result'; and more recently Chambers: 'the war between the Romans and Philip—how it was conducted, *why it was fought*, and how it ended.' Why this should have happened I do not know, but διὰ with the genitive has not to do with reason but with instrument or agency. Nor is the error universal. Schweighäuser, predictably, did not go wrong; in his translation the clause comes out: 'quemadmodum illud (*sc. bellum*) fuit gestum quibus ducibus, quo exitu.' Shuckburgh's 'the persons engaged' does even better. Pédech²⁸ recognized that 'la notion d'agent' was at issue here, and de Foucault in the Budé edition of Book 3²⁹ takes his cue from Schweighäuser with 'avec quels chefs.' All of which is to say that, if Polybius did treat the second Macedonian war in terms of ἀρχή and αἰτία, his treatment has perished without a trace.²⁹ The extent of what we have is his statement that the war against Philip took its origins (ἀφορμὰ) from the war against Hannibal (3. 32. 7). Except insofar as it establishes a connexion between Punic war and Macedonian war this does not take us very far. Unless, perhaps, it indicates that for Polybius the Roman

²⁸ P. Pédech, *La méthode historique de Polybe* (1964), 37.

²⁹ Pédech treats of the αἰτία, προφάσεις and ἀρχή of the second Macedonian war at some length (*Méthode*, 113-23), but without any foundation. He finds the ἀρχή in the crossing of the Roman consul P. Sulpicius Galba into Greece, but there is no reason to believe that this was the ἀρχή and not, say, one of Philip's attacks on Athens. More seriously, the

beginning of his discussion reveals a basic misunderstanding of how Polybius' causal system worked. 'Le problème des αἰτία se ramène, suivant la théorie, à la description des mobiles qui ont guidé l'action des belligérents' (i.e., Romans, Rhodians, Attalus, and Philip; p. 113). As has been seen here, the αἰτία are what lead to the ἀρχή, the action of just one of the belligerents. On Pédech's misunderstanding, cf. Walbank, *Polybius*, 158 with n. 12.

ventures against Philip were not so separate as the modern notions of 'first' and 'second' Macedonian wars would imply.³⁰

The oddity in the matter of the war against Antiochus has at least to do with what is in Polybius rather than with what is not. The war is against Antiochus (who made the first move), but the αἰτία (or the chief αἰτία, for Polybius envisages more than one at 3. 3. 4) is the anger of the Aetolians. If, however, one bears in mind Polybius' statement about the relation of ἀρχή and αἰτία at 3. 6. 7, this is not really problematical. He gives a summary account at 3. 7. 1-2, and it is there primarily that one must look when asking the question about responsibility:

And indeed it is clear that the reason (αἰτία) for (the war of) Antiochus and the Romans must be reckoned to be the anger of the Aetolians. For they, believing they had been slighted in many respects having to do with the end of the war against Philip, as I have stated above (in 3. 3. 3), not only dragged in Antiochus but were ready to do or to suffer anything owing to the anger that arose out of the aforementioned circumstances.

One should proceed in two steps here, as was the case with the second Punic war. The stated αἰτία is the anger of the Aetolians. From this clear assertion one goes on to ask why it was that they were angry. Polybius' statement on this score is, perhaps, not quite so transparent. They were angry because they believed themselves to have been slighted in a number of respects relating to the outcome of the war against Philip. In particular, as we know from Book 18 (see esp. chs. 38-9), they felt that the Romans had unfairly refused to give them certain cities to which they (the Aetolians) believed they had a right. The Aetolian anger, then, arose from the manner in which (to their mind, at least) the Romans were treating them. Were they, however, entitled to act in the way they did, in the way that Polybius believed the Carthaginians were entitled to react to the Roman seizure of Sardinia? If they were, then the responsibility for the war rests ultimately, on Polybius' account, with the Roman conduct towards the Aetolians after Cynoscephalae. If not, then with the (misguided) Aetolian view of Rome's conduct then. It is precisely at this point that the incompleteness of Polybius' text becomes a serious problem. There is no question that Polybius' generally hostile portrayal of the Aetolians would not square readily with the view that he thought their anger to be justified. On the other hand, it does look as if his treatment of these Aetolians in the narrative of the years after 197 is not as unreservedly hostile as in what had gone before, and he does not, in particular, attack their anger as unjustified.³¹ What is important for the present purpose and what is clear is that it is, at the least, by no means obvious from what remains of Polybius (either directly or in Livy) that the Aetolians had not been badly done by. If there is a single crux here, it is 18. 38, where Phaeneas the Aetolian raises a two-part protest: (1) owing to the fact of their co-operation with Rome in the present war (καθότι συνεπολέμησαν νῦν) the Aetolians should recover the cities previously in their league; (2) by the alliance of 211 the Aetolians should receive the cities captured in war, after the Romans had helped themselves to everything moveable. To this Flamininus replied that Phaeneas was in error 'on both counts': (1) the original treaty (of 211) had not been in force since the Aetolians had abandoned the Romans and made their own peace with Philip (in 206/5); (2) even if it were still in force, its terms had got nothing to do with such cities as had surrendered themselves to the Romans. Whether Flamininus' version of the terms of the treaty of 211 is accurate or not,³² the fact is that his

³⁰ It may be noted that the numbering has not always been the same. In Florus there are two Macedonian wars, of which the second is the one against Perseus, the first comprising Rome's conflict(s) with Philip (1. 23, 28). Cf. E. Bickerman, *CP* 40 (1945), 137 n. 1.

³¹ This view of Polybius on the Aetolians is argued to good effect by K. S. Sacks, 'Polybius' other view of Aetolia', *JHS* 95 (1975), 92-106 (p. 93 for the specific point); it should, perhaps, be asked whether some criticism might be implicit in δόξαντες at 3. 7. 2). I do not, however, see the connexion between Sacks' main argument and the 'dichotomy', assented to by him (106), between Polybius the 'reporter' and Polybius the 'editor'.

³² This question has been discussed often and at length, but it cannot be resolved, as the stone bearing the only surviving copy of the treaty is broken before the end of the text (for text, evidence and bibliography see H. H. Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* 3 (1969), no. 536; for bibliography on the Polybian side especially, D. Musti, *ANRW* 1. 2, 1146 ff.). It is, of course, possible that the distinction adduced by Flamininus did form part of the treaty, but it is also worth noting that Livy's version of the agreement (26. 24. 9-13) contains no reference to such a provision; cf. Briscoe, *Commentary*, ad 33. 13. 9-12 (he rightly emphasizes Flamininus' failure to respond to Phaeneas' first point).

two-part reply has to do only with Phaeneas' *second* point; the first is not touched upon directly and is only implicitly denied any validity. On reflection, the whole business becomes extraordinary. On what terms *did* the Aetolians ally themselves with the Romans in this war against Philip? ³³ The impression one gets is that they thought they knew and were astonished (and angry) when Flamininus informed them that in fact they did not. How this situation could have come about cannot be firmly established, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Aetolians, when they joined the Romans in 199, were either told or allowed to believe something that was not true. Or again, they might have been told something that was true in 199 but that ceased to be true on the morrow of Cynoscephalae.

Whatever the answer here, it remains the case that the origins of the war with Antiochus have to do with Roman actions and aims, for it does, on balance, seem more likely that the anger of the Aetolians was a reaction to what the Romans actually did (and not to a misguided Aetolian view of what they were doing).³⁴ And specifically on the question of Roman aims here, it will do to recall what Polybius says of Scipio at 21. 4. 5: that he knew 'the end of the war and of the whole project (τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς) lay not in the subjugation of the Aetolian league, but in gaining power over Asia by defeating Antiochus.'

Still better possibilities are offered in the case of the war against Perseus. Here, as was remarked above, the difficulty for Polybius' general view was seen to lie in the fact that he made Philip responsible for the war. On this occasion it may be possible to see in more detail how Polybius' account worked. It is on 22. 18. 10 that the statement as to Philip's responsibility is based:

We maintain that Philip, the son of Demetrius, planned (διανοηθῆναι) to wage the final war against the Romans and had all the preparations ready for this project (ἐπιβολή), and that, after he had died, Perseus became the actual executor of the deeds.

Philip planned the war. That is clearly stated.³⁵ But here again we must try to follow Polybius' causal chain back to its beginning. What, that is, led Philip to form this project? The answer is mostly there in Book 22, and in this connexion the important chapters in the narrative are 13-14 and 18. Chapter 18, part of which is quoted above, clearly belongs to Polybius' discussion of the αἰτίαι of the third Macedonian war. Chapters 13-14 (esp. 14. 7 f.) equally clearly contain part of Polybius' discussion of what led Philip to form his plan of war against Rome (note esp. 14. 8: ἐπινοούμενα; 14. 10: τὸ προτεθέν; 14. 11: ταῦτα δὲ διανοηθεῖς; 14. 12: χάριν τῆς προκειμένης ἐπιβολῆς; with these last two in particular cf. 18. 10, quoted above). This requires that chapters 13-14 and chapter 18 be seen as together forming a part of Polybius' treatment of the αἰτίαι of the war against Perseus.³⁶ The question here posed—what led Philip to form his project?—must accordingly

³³ On the Aetolians rejoining Rome there is only the following: (1) In spring 199 the Roman ambassadors say to the Aetolians 'et vobis restituendi vos in amicitiam societatemque nostram fortuna oblata est' (Livy 31. 31. 20); (2) the Aetolians do not rejoin on the spot, but later in the year we learn that they have done so (Livy 31. 41. 1: 'hae causae Damocritum Aetolosque restituerant Romanis').

³⁴ Support for this must be seen in Polybius' statement that the war against Antiochus took its origins from the war against Philip (as that war did from the one against Hannibal): 3. 32. 7, a passage rightly stressed by Sacks, *op. cit.* (n. 31), 93.

³⁵ What is not stated is that 'la vraie cause (αἰτία) de la guerre, c'est la pensée de Philippe' (Pédech, *Méthode*, 125). Nor could it have been stated, for αἰτίαι in Polybius are not in any vague way what we think, but things that lead us to decide to act in a certain way (Pol. 3. 6. 7). Note also 22. 1. 5, where αἰτίαι are referred to in the plural.

³⁶ The argument here does not require that chs. 13-14 (overlapping excerpts from the *Exc. de legationibus gentium* and the *Exc. de legationibus Romanorum*) and ch. 18 (from the *Exc. de sententiis*) be put directly together in the text of Polybius; the relation between them is clear enough without

having to do that. What is essential is that this relation between the section on Philip's actions at Maroneia (with the Roman intervention) and that on the αἰτίαι of the third Macedonian war be recognized and appreciated. The sequence is guaranteed by 22. 1. 5 (from the 'table of contents' to the book given in the excerpts *de legationibus gentium*): 'Ἡ γενομένη σφαγή διὰ Φιλίππου τοῦ βασιλέως ἐν Μαρωνείᾳ. παρουσία πρεσβευτῶν ἐκ Ῥώμης καὶ τὰ προσταχθέντα διὰ τούτων. αἰτία δὲ ὡς ἐγένετο Ῥωμαίοις πρὸς Περσέα πόλεμος. This notice is sufficient to refute any suggestion on the basis of correspondence with Livy that ch. 18 should precede chs. 13-14 (with chs. 13-14 cf. Livy 39. 34. 1 ff., with ch. 18 cf. Livy 39. 23. 5 f.); in any event, while the correspondence between Livy 39. 34 and Pol. 22. 13-14 is quite direct, that between Livy 39. 23 and Pol. 22. 18 is by no means so. For my part, I believe the best answer is, in fact, the juxtaposition of chs. 13-14 and 18. This would involve placing ch. 18 after ch. 14 and before ch. 15, and all that this would require is transferring chs. 16-17 to the previous Olympiad year (from 185/4 B.C. to 186/5 B.C.). To this transference there is no obstacle whatever, and the earlier date accords at least as well with the mention of Ptolemy's age in 22. 17. 7.

be answered on the basis of chapters 13–14, and these chapters require that the answer take a certain direction. Philip's plan is a reaction to Roman behaviour towards him, and in particular to the orders he is receiving from Rome (13. 1, from the Senate; 14. 1, from the Roman ambassador, Ap. Claudius Pulcher). Even more particularly, it is his reaction to the Romans' decision about him (21. 14. 6):

Appius and his colleagues, having condemned Philip both for his outrage towards the Maroneans and for his estrangement towards the Romans, departed holding views of this kind (cf. 14. 7 for Philip's reaction to this).

The process is basically the same as in the case of Carthaginian reaction to the seizure of Sardinia.³⁷ Rome's orders on the present occasion (and the preceding ones like it) may be of a different status from Rome's seizure of Sardinia, but it was the orders nonetheless that were influential in leading Philip to plan as he did. The question as to who was responsible is a complex one, but at least it cannot be answered simply by saying that Philip conceived the project of a war with Rome.

Indeed, if anything has emerged from the preceding discussion, it is (I hope) that Polybius' discussions of reasons are not essentially aimed at answering questions of responsibility. They are constructed with the intention of explaining why someone did something, or, more strictly, what the factors were that led someone to decide to do something. It should also have emerged that, if we are to inquire of Polybius as to responsibility, we must do so by way of ascertaining what these factors were. Once this is realized, and once this procedure is adopted, then the notion of a conflict between Polybius' general statement about Rome's universal aim and his detailed analyses of the reasons behind wars loses all support. Where we can approach the αἰτίαι we find that Roman actions are among the motivating factors, if they are not indeed the chief ones. But, to repeat, it is with reference to these factors that Polybius seeks to explain what happened, not to answer questions about war-guilt.

v

It may now be useful to turn briefly to an implication of the theory that the general view of Polybius is contradicted by his detailed treatment of the outbreaks of wars. This (now untenable) thesis suggests that if the Romans had been aiming at universal dominion, then they should have started the wars. Some further passages should be adduced here to show that Polybius at least believed the Romans capable of a great deal more subtlety than this.

In 167/6 the Thracian king Cotys sent an embassy to Rome to ask for the return of his son (who, a hostage with Perseus, had been captured by the Romans along with Perseus' children) and to justify his own co-operation with the Macedonian King. The Romans agreed to the return of his son, and on this Polybius has the following (30. 17. 2; the contrast with Livy 45. 42. 6 ff. is illuminating):

The Romans, thinking that they had attained their object, the war against Perseus having gone as they planned, and that their difference with Cotys no longer had any point, allowed him to take back his son . . .

The implication is that in other circumstances there might have been a point in maintaining this 'difference', and such is effectively what was done in an analogous case eight years later. In 160/59 Demetrius, who had recently established himself on the Seleucid throne after his escape from Rome, sent ambassadors to the Senate, who brought with them a certain Leptines, the murderer of Cn. Octavius, one of the Roman envoys who had been sent out in 163 as part of a commission to disarm Syria. Along with Leptines was sent his accomplice, the anti-Roman scholar Isocrates. The Senate in 160/59, not fully trusting

³⁷ With 3. 30. 4 (cf. above, p. 10) compare especially 22. 14. 8: καθόλου μὲν οὖν πρόθυμος ἦν εἰς τὸ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ μετέλθειν αὐτοῦς.

Demetrius, elected not to deal with these two despite the frequent assertions of Leptines that he had done the deed. Polybius' view of the reasoning behind this is as follows (32. 3. 11-12):

For the Senate, as it seems to me, supposing that it would seem to people³⁸ that the murder had been avenged if they took over and punished the guilty ones, scarcely received them, but kept the charge open, in order to have the power to make use of the accusations when they wished.

It thus remained possible to attribute the murder to Demetrius, and it need hardly be said that any war begun on account of the murder of an ambassador would be seen to have been begun justly.

Ambassadors were involved in the Roman decision to go to war against the Dalmatians in 156, but in a significantly revealing way, as Polybius makes clear (32. 13. 8-9):

Therefore they planned, by initiating a war against the aforementioned people (the Dalmatians), both to renew, as it were, the drive and zeal of their own masses, and, by terrifying the Illyrians, to compel them to obey their orders. These, then, were the reasons (αἰτίαι) for which the Romans made war on the Dalmatians; to the outside world (τοῖς ἑκτός) they proclaimed that they had decided to go to war on account of the insult to the ambassadors.

Had we not this clear statement there might have been some temptation to think that the Dalmatians' treatment of the Roman ambassadors had, on Polybius' account, some real connexion with the Roman decision to go to war. This should be a warning.

A similar situation, involving identical concern for the opinion of the outside world, was seen by Polybius just prior to the outbreak of the last 'war' against Carthage (36. 2):

This decision had long ago been ratified in their individual minds, but they were looking for a suitable occasion and a pretext that would seem respectable to the world outside (πρὸς τοὺς ἑκτός). The Romans were wont to pay much attention to this matter. And in doing so they displayed very good sense, for, as Demetrius (of Phalerum) says, if the inception of a war seems just, it renders victories greater and ill-successes less dangerous, but if it seems to be dishonourable or base, it has the opposite effect. So on this occasion too they differed with one another about the opinion of the outside world (περὶ τῆς τῶν ἑκτός διαλήψεως) and almost abandoned the war.

This is not unlike the situation with the Dalmatians in 156. It goes further, however, in adding the element of generality,³⁹ and this should be enough to make us realize that the Romans in Polybius will not be found going out and beginning wars in any obvious fashion. On the contrary, he saw them as being on the lookout for suitable occasions and handsome pretexts, once they had decided that a war was what was needed. It would appear, then, that the fact that the Romans do not begin (i.e., perform the ἀρχή of) a war, tells us nothing about Roman intentions or aims at the time. It may even be that Polybius believed the Romans took care to see that other people began the wars. This notion, which is consistent with everything said thus far and particularly with the last few passages quoted, is found in a fragment (99 Büttner-Wobst) uncertainly attributed to Polybius:

³⁸ τοῖς πολλοῖς, which should perhaps be taken strictly as meaning 'the many' (at Rome). From this it would follow that handsome pretexts were sometimes required to convince the people of Rome of the justice and necessity of senatorial decisions. That many at Rome could indeed need such convincing emerges from, *inter alia*, the difficulty over the vote on the war against Philip in 200 (Livy 31. 6. 3 ff.).

³⁹ That Polybius is indeed generalizing about the Romans here is a point worth insisting upon, for he has been taken, on the basis of a passage in Book 31, as indicating that such behaviour was a new departure for the Romans in the 160's (see Walbank, *Polybius*, 170 and cf. *Entretiens Hardt* xx, 12). The passage is 31. 10. 7: πολὺ γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο τὸ γένος ἐστὶ τῶν διαβουλιῶν παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, ἐν οἷς διὰ τῆς τῶν πέλας ἀγνοίας αὐξουσι καὶ κατασκευάζονται τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρχὴν πραγματικῶς,

ἅμα χαριζόμενοι καὶ δοκοῦντες εὐεργετεῖν τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας. The beginning of the statement is at issue, and Walbank renders it 'Many Roman decisions are now of this kind' (cf. Paton in the Loeb translation: 'For many decisions of the Romans are now of this kind'). This would indicate a departure, but it is not what Polybius is saying; for this use of ἤδη see A. Mauersberger, *Polybios-Lexikon* 1. 3 (1966), col. 1108. Again, Schweighäuser's rendition is correct ('Multum enim Romani hoc genere consiliorum utuntur'), and Shuckburgh also has it right with 'Measures of this class are very frequent among the Romans'. Another firm indication that Polybius is speaking of the period before 168 as well as of that after is the presence of αὐξουσι: the αὐξησης of Roman domination was complete by 168 (Pol. 3. 4. 2).

οἱ γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν πρόνοιαν ἐποιοῦντο τοῦ μὴ κατάρχοντες φαίνεσθαι χειρῶν ἀδίκων μηδ' ἀναιρούμενοι τοὺς πολέμους τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν τοῖς πέλας, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ δοκεῖν ἀμυνόμενοι καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τοὺς πολέμους.

For the Romans took no ordinary forethought not to appear to be the initiators of unjust actions and not to appear to be attacking those around them when they took on wars, but always to seem to be acting in self-defense and to enter upon wars out of necessity.

This fragment, which in its language and phraseology is certainly Polybian (albeit not uniquely so), has been seen as deriving from the narrative from which the above-quoted 36. 2 survives.⁴⁰ It fits there admirably and is also consistent with the other passages quoted in this section. Beyond this it cannot be proved to be Polybian, but it is, at all events, in accordance with all that has been said here about Polybius' views on the reasons behind Rome's wars. And if it is true, then the Romans succeeded admirably, leading not a few to believe that the wars which extended their power were in some sense defensive.

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⁴⁰ The text of the fragment as it stands has been reconstructed (see the notes in Büttner-Wobst, on his fr. 99, and in Hultsch, on his fr. 157) from four entries in the *Suda*, of which the relevant parts are as follows: (s.v. ἀμυνόμενοι) οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι ἔθος εἶχον μὴ ἀρχοντες φαίνεσθαι χειρῶν ἀδίκων, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ δοκεῖν ἀμυνόμενοι κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τοὺς πολέμους, (s.v. ἀναιρεθεῖς, ἀναιρεῖσθαι) οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν πρόνοιαν ἐποιοῦντο Ῥωμαῖοι τοῦ μὴ κατάρχοντας

φαίνεσθαι μηδ' ἀναιρούμενοι τοὺς πολέμους, (s.v. ἐμβαίνειν) οἱ γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι πρόνοιαν ἐποιοῦντο τοῦ μηδέποτε πρότεροι τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν τοῖς πέλας, μηδ' ἀρχοντας φαίνεσθαι χειρῶν ἀδίκων, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ δοκεῖν ἀμυνόμενοι ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τοὺς πολέμους, (s.v. πέλας) πλὴν πρόνοιαν αἰεὶ ἐποίουν Ῥωμαῖοι μὴ ποτε πρότεροι τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν τοῖς πέλας μηδ' ἀρχοντες φαίνεσθαι χειρῶν ἀδίκων. For the rapprochement with 36. 2, cf. H. Nissen, *Rhein. Mus.* 26 (1871), 275.